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WEED WHACKING THROUGH THE TENTH 
AMENDMENT: NAVIGATING A TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION THREAT TO WITHHOLD 
FUNDING FROM MARIJUANA-FRIENDLY 
STATES 
Arlen Gharibian* 
 
          The Trump administration has taken a firm stance 
against marijuana legalization at the state level. While an 
official federal policy is still pending, this Article focuses on 
whether the Trump administration’s threats to prevent 
California from pursuing its duly enacted marijuana 
legalization law violates the Tenth Amendment. This Article 
then addresses how the federal government could achieve its 
goal while remaining within the bounds of the Constitution. 
  
 
 * J.D., May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to Professor Allan Ides for 
your continued support and guidance, both with this Article and my career. A special thanks to my 
parents and my sister, Carla, without whom none of my success would be possible. 
(7) 52.3_GHARIBIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:10 PM 
276 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:275 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 277 
II.  HISTORICAL TRENDS IN MARIJUANA .......................................... 278 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF TENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE ....... 285 
A.  The Development of the Supreme Court’s Tenth 
Amendment Jurisprudence ............................................ 286 
1.  The “Darby Era” ....................................................... 287 
2.  The “National League of Cities Era” ........................ 287 
3.  The “Garcia Era” ...................................................... 288 
4.  South Dakota v. Dole ................................................ 289 
5.  The “New York v. United States Era” (Present-Day 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence) ................................. 291 
B.  Federal Government Efforts to Control State Action and 
the Attempt to Influence States via the Threat of 
Withholding Federal Funding ........................................ 295 
1.  State-Sponsored Sports Betting and the Tenth 
Amendment ............................................................... 295 
2.  The Withholding of Federal Funding from Sanctuary 
Cities ......................................................................... 296 
a.  Northern District of California ............................ 297 
b.  Eastern District of Pennsylvania ......................... 298 
IV.  THREATS TO WITHHOLD FEDERAL FUNDING FROM LOCAL 
JURISDICTIONS THAT LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IMPLICATE TENTH 
AMENDMENT CONCERNS ....................................................... 300 
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS WITHIN THE BOUNDS 
OF THE LAW ........................................................................... 302 
VI.  JUSTIFICATIONS: APPLYING THE DOLE TEST WILL ALLOW A 
POTENTIAL FEDERAL POLICY OF WITHHOLDING FUNDING TO 
PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER ........................................... 302 
A.  Pursuing the General Welfare ......................................... 303 
B.  Unambiguous Conditions and State Freedom to Exercise 
Choice ............................................................................ 304 
C.  The Trump Administration’s Interest in Marijuana 
Legalization ................................................................... 306 
D.  Other Potential Constitutional Bars ................................ 307 
VII.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 308  
(7) 52.3_GHARIBIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:10 PM 
2019] FEDERAL FUNDING & MARIJUANA-FRIENDLY STATES 277 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to common knowledge, marijuana’s prevalence in 
America dates back to the colonial era.1 In fact, the plant was so 
inherent to society that the Founding Fathers wrote the first two drafts 
of the Declaration of Independence on hemp paper.2 Yet, as states 
today increasingly accept marijuana within their borders, the federal 
government grows increasingly irritated.3 
On November 8, 2016, California voters approved Proposition 
64, the Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA), legalizing recreational 
marijuana use in the state.4 Nevertheless, marijuana legalization at the 
state level has received backlash from President Trump’s Justice 
Department, indicating that states should expect to see greater 
enforcement of federal marijuana laws.5 Among this backlash is the 
federal government’s potential threat to withhold funds from 
California if the state continues to support the AUMA.6 
This conflict between California and the federal government 
raises Tenth Amendment concerns. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution explicitly states that “[t]he powers not 
 
 1. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., State Medical Marijuana Laws: Understanding the Laws 
and Their Limitations, 23 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 413, 415 (2003). 
 2. JOHN W. ROULAC, HEMP HORIZONS: THE COMEBACK OF THE WORLD’S MOST 
PROMISING PLANT 32 (1997). 
 3. See generally German Lopez, The Trump Administration’s New War on Marijuana, 
Explained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/4/16849866/marijuana-
legalization-trump-sessions-cole-memo (last updated Jan. 5, 2018, 10:35 AM) (“Some legalization 
advocates worried that Sessions, a vocal critic of legalization, would simply take a tougher 
interpretation of the [Cole] memo — by, say, telling prosecutors to crack down on states that let 
any marijuana land in the hands of minors or across state lines (both of which are, to some extent, 
unavoidable no matter how strict a state is). But Sessions has gone even further, ending the Cole 
memo and related guidances altogether. Since marijuana is illegal at the federal level, the change 
will let federal prosecutors go after state-legal marijuana at their own discretion — a return to the 
pre-memo days.”). 
 4. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_64,_Marijuana_Legalization_(2016) (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2018); Patrick McGreevy, Californians Vote to Legalize Recreational Use of Marijuana 
in the State, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:12 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-election-day-2016-proposition-64-
marijuana-1478281845-htmlstory.html. 
 5. See Lopez, supra note 3. 
 6. Jacob Margolis, What Happens if Jeff Sessions Tries Dismantling California’s Pot 
Industry?, 89.3 KPCC: TAKE TWO (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.scpr.org/programs/take-
two/2017/03/02/55394/what-happens-if-jeff-sessions-tries-dismantling-ca/. 
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delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”7 
This Article explores two issues: (1) whether the Trump 
administration’s threats to prevent California from pursuing its duly 
enacted marijuana legalization law violates the Tenth Amendment; 
and (2) if so, how the Trump administration can pursue its attempt to 
prevent California from following through with marijuana legalization 
without violating the Tenth Amendment. 
II.  HISTORICAL TRENDS IN MARIJUANA 
Before delving into the tension between Proposition 64 and the 
Trump administration’s enforcement priorities, it will be useful to first 
understand how marijuana has been classified over time, including the 
various positions the federal government and individual states have 
taken in making decisions regarding marijuana legalization. 
Marijuana has been a part of American history since Jamestown 
settlers first introduced it in 1611, when they arrived in Virginia with 
the plant for use in hemp production.8 From the time marijuana arrived 
in the United States, the plant’s cultivation flourished.9 Physicians and 
pharmacists widely dispensed marijuana for a variety of illnesses, and 
even included marijuana in standard pharmaceutical reference 
works.10 Even the most notable American presidents, including 
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, advocated hemp 
cultivation and grew marijuana themselves.11 
Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, states began to 
oppose marijuana.12 In 1913, California, always a trailblazer, became 
the first state to outlaw marijuana.13 Other states soon followed, and 
by 1931, twenty-nine states had passed laws prohibiting the use of 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 8. Pacula et al., supra note 1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA—MEDICAL, 
RECREATIONAL, AND SCIENTIFIC 16, 18 (2012); Corliss Knapp Engle, John Adams, Farmer and 
Gardner, 61 ARNOLDIA, no. 4, 2002, at 9, 10. 
 12. BRUCE BARCOTT, WEED THE PEOPLE: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL MARIJUANA IN AMERICA 
20 (2015). 
 13. Id. 
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marijuana for nonmedicinal purposes.14 This sudden backlash against 
marijuana was rooted not in the plant itself, but rather in the racial 
identities of its users.15 State after state prohibited marijuana, “usually 
when faced with significant numbers of Mexicans or Negroes utilizing 
the drug.”16 Soon, nearly every western state had passed anti-
marijuana legislation.17 
The federal government was not far behind and first attempted to 
curb marijuana use in 1937 by passing the Marihuana Tax Act.18 
While the Marihuana Tax Act did not prohibit marijuana, Congress 
essentially endeavored to outlaw marijuana with an extremely 
prohibitive taxing scheme.19 Indeed, the overwhelmingly anti-
marijuana environment that gave way to the Marihuana Tax Act 
continued to have an impact, leading to more legislation criminalizing 
marijuana offenses throughout the 1950s.20 However, physicians 
could continue to legally prescribe marijuana during this time.21 Still, 
marijuana prohibition reached its peak in 1970 when Congress passed 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, now 
known as the Federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA).22 
The CSA replaced the Marihuana Tax Act and created five 
categories, known as “schedules,” for all controlled substances, 
classifying the substances “based on their relative potential for abuse 
as well as recognized medical usefulness.”23 Congress characterized 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug, indicating that the plant “had no 
currently accepted medical use in the United States and making it 
illegal for doctors to medically prescribe.”24 Indeed, marijuana’s 
 
 14. Adam Rathge, Pondering Pot: Marijuana’s History and the Future of the War on Drugs, 
ORG. AM. HISTORIANS: AM. HISTORIAN, http://tah.oah.org/issue-5/pondering-pot/ (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018). 
 15. BARCOTT, supra note 12. 
 16. LARRY SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA 30–31 (1998). The first 
cities to perceive marijuana use as a problem were Texas border towns like El Paso and New 
Orleans. Id. African Americans began using marijuana in New Orleans around 1910, and early 
fears were that the vice would spread to white schoolchildren. Id. 
 17. John Caldbick, Marijuana Legalization in Washington, HISTORYLINK (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.historylink.org/File/10268. 
 18. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937). 
 19. BARCOTT, supra note 12, at 24. 
 20. Pacula et al., supra note 1, at 416. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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Schedule I label is strict and comprehensive, classifying “any product 
that contains any amount of tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) to be a 
Schedule I controlled substance, even if such product is made from 
portions of the cannabis plant that are excluded from the CSA 
definition of ‘marihuana.’”25 Congress had successfully outlawed 
marijuana at the federal level, making illegal the plant which had 
flourished in the United States even before the country’s founding. 
Twenty-six years passed before California pushed back, once 
again asserting itself as a pioneer for change. In 1996, California 
voters passed Proposition 215, dubbed the “Compassionate Use 
Act.”26 Through the Compassionate Use Act, California offered legal 
protection to medical marijuana users by removing state-level criminal 
penalties for the use and possession of marijuana by patients with a 
doctor’s recommendation.27 Proposition 215 aimed “[t]o ensure that 
seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana 
for medical purposes” when a physician determines “that the person’s 
health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of . . . 
[any illness] for which marijuana provides relief.”28 In the twenty-two 
years since California’s stand against the CSA, thirty-two other states, 
as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico, have 
instituted comprehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis 
programs.29 
The federal government did not respond positively to California’s 
legalization of medical marijuana. Until just a few years ago, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) was conducting raids on legal medical 
marijuana dispensaries in California.30 In these raids, the DEA shut 
down multiple dispensaries and seized their marijuana.31 
 
 25. Interpretation of Listing of “Tetrahydrocannabinols” in Schedule I, 66 Fed. Reg. 
51530 (Oct. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308). 
 26. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2018). 
 30. See Matt Ferner, DEA Raids 2 Los Angeles Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, HUFFPOST 
(Oct. 24, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/24/dea-raid-medical-
marijuana-los-angeles_n_6038926.html; Daniel White, DEA Must Stop Interfering with Legal 
Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, Federal Court Rules, TIME (Oct. 20, 2015), 
http://time.com/4080110/dea-medical-marijuana-california-ruling/. 
 31. Ferner, supra note 30; White, supra note 30. 
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In 2014, however, Congress added the Rohrabacher-Farr 
amendment to the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2015, an appropriations bill that funds the 
Departments of Commerce and Justice, as well as various other 
agencies.32 The amendment bars the Justice Department from using 
federal funding to prevent states with medical marijuana laws “from 
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, 
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”33 In late-2015, Judge 
Charles Breyer of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California ruled that the DEA could no longer interfere with 
medical marijuana providers operating legally under state laws.34 
In May 2016, just three months after his confirmation, United 
States Attorney General Jeff Sessions began advocating his strong 
anti-marijuana sentiments to members of Congress.35 Attorney 
General Sessions heads the Department of Justice (DOJ), which 
encompasses federal law enforcement agencies such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DEA.36 In a letter addressed to 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority Leader 
Chuck Schumer, House Speaker Paul Ryan, and House Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi, Attorney General Sessions opposed the 
Rohrabacher-Farr amendment to the appropriations bill for the DOJ.37 
Specifically, Attorney General Sessions expressed his concern with 
regard to Congress restricting the discretion of the DOJ to fund 
particular prosecutions, “particularly in the midst of an [sic] historic 
 
 32. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113–235, 
128 Stat 2130 (2014); Christopher Ingraham, Federal Court Tells the DEA to Stop Harassing 
Medical Marijuana Providers, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/20/federal-court-tells-the-dea-to-stop-
harassing-medical-marijuana-providers/?utm_term=.2cbe1873dc1d. 
 33. Ingraham, supra note 32. 
 34. United States v. Marin All. for Med. Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 35. Christopher Ingraham, Jeff Sessions Personally Asked Congress to Let Him Prosecute 
Medical-Marijuana Providers, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/13/jeff-sessions-personally-asked-
congress-to-let-him-prosecute-medical-marijuana-providers/?utm_term=.91d2fc1ecd5e. 
 36. Randy Robinson, Jeff Sessions Hates Weed but Cannabis Lawyers Are Ready to Fight 
Back, MERRY JANE (Nov. 1, 2017, 3:35 PM), https://merryjane.com/news/jeff-sessions-hates-
weed-but-cannabis-lawyers-ready-to-fight-back. 
 37. Letter from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S., to Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority 
Leader, Chuck Schumer, Senate Minority Leader, Paul Ryan, House Speaker, and Nancy Pelosi, 
House Minority Leader (May 1, 2017) (on file with Congress); Ingraham, supra note 35. 
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drug epidemic and potentially long-term uptick in violent crime.”38 He 
advised, “The Department must be in a position to use all laws 
available to combat the transnational drug organizations and 
dangerous drug traffickers who threaten American lives.”39 
Yet, despite resistance from both Attorney General Sessions and 
the DEA, the legalization of medical marijuana throughout more than 
half of the nation seemed to initiate complete recreational marijuana 
legalization at the state level. Since 2012, ten states and the District of 
Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational use.40 In 2012, 
Colorado and Washington became the first two states to legalize 
recreational marijuana.41 Between 2014 and 2015, Alaska, Oregon, 
and the District of Columbia followed suit.42 Finally, in 2016, 
California, Nevada, Maine, and Massachusetts joined the budding 
trend of recreational marijuana legalization.43 
After a proposal to legalize marijuana in California failed in 2014 
due to its backers’ inability to collect sufficient signatures, 
Californians were adamant to succeed the second time around.44 In 
2016, tech billionaire and former Facebook president Sean Parker 
spearheaded another attempt to prevail in legalizing marijuana in 
California.45 With the support of extensive funding, including over $1 
million in funding from Parker alone, “[b]allot-measure backers 
collected more than 600,000 signatures to put the initiative before 
voters.”46 As a result, Proposition 64 was introduced on California’s 
November 8, 2016 ballot as an initiated state statute.47 
 
 38. Letter from Jeff Sessions, supra note 37. 
 39. Id. 
 40. State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING THE STATES & LOCALITIES, 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last 
updated Nov. 7, 2018). 
 41. Melia Robinson, It’s 2017: Here’s Where You Can Legally Smoke Weed Now, BUS. 
INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/where-can-you-legally-smoke-
weed-2017-1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Trevor Hughes, California Likely to Vote on Marijuana Legalization in November, USA 
TODAY (May 4, 2016, 4:37 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2016/05/04/california-likely-vote-
marijuana-legalization-november/83926306/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), supra note 4. 
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California voters passed Proposition 64 on November 8, 2016.48 
Now, Californians who are twenty-one and older can possess, 
transport, buy and use up to an ounce of marijuana for recreational 
purposes.49 Moreover, the proposition permits individuals to grow as 
many as six plants, and allows for retail sales of marijuana with a 15% 
tax imposed.50 “Local governments may reasonably regulate 
cultivation, up to and including requiring cultivation indoors or in a 
greenhouse.”51 Yet, while Proposition 64 seems straightforward 
enough, it arrived at a time which may cause unanticipated conflicts. 
The same day that Golden State voters elected to legalize the 
recreational use of marijuana, Americans elected Donald Trump to 
become the forty-fifth President of the United States.52 While 
President Trump himself has previously suggested that he will leave 
marijuana legalization up to the individual states, his current 
administration has not taken this same laissez faire approach.53 At the 
forefront of this federal stance against state-level legalization is the 
attorney general, Jeff Sessions.54 
Attorney General Sessions has not been shy about his thoughts on 
marijuana.55 He has stated that “good people don’t smoke marijuana,” 
and that the effects of marijuana are “only slightly less awful” than 
those of heroin.56 Indeed, Attorney General Sessions has gone so far 
as to say he thought the Ku Klux Klan was “okay until [he] learned 
they smoked pot.”57 Nevertheless, the federal government has not yet 
 
 48. Id.; McGreevy, supra note 4. 
 49. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), supra note 4. 
 50. Id. 
 51. JEREMY DAW, NEW RULES: CALIFORNIA’S MARIJUANA LAW EXPLAINED 55 (2017). 
 52. Donald J. Trump, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/people/donald-j-trump/ 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2018); Elijah Wolfson & David Yanofsky, One in Every Five Americans Is 
About to Get Legally High AF After this Election, QUARTZ (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://qz.com/832370/marijuana-legalization-succeeded-in-the-2016-elections-despite-the-
results-of-the-presidential-race/. 
 53. Patrick McGreevy, Weed’s Legal in California, but Activists Fear a Battle Ahead with Jeff 
Sessions, Trump’s Pick for Attorney General, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-marijuana-legalization-jeff-sessions-snap-20161201-
story.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Rick Anderson, Sessions Says He Has ‘Serious Concerns’ About Legal Marijuana. Now 
States Wonder What’s Next, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-sessions-marijuana-20170809-story.html. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Paul Waldman, Why Jeff Sessions’s Marijuana Crackdown is Going to Make Legalization 
More Likely, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
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instituted an official policy change toward marijuana.58 Attorney 
General Sessions has, however, threatened and attempted to withhold 
funding to achieve his goal of ensuring that local law enforcement 
officials comply with federal immigration law in “sanctuary cities.”59 
It is believed that Attorney General Sessions may use this same 
coercive tactic to curb marijuana’s legalization at the state level.60 
On January 4, 2018, Attorney General Sessions released a 
memorandum which immediately rescinded the Cole Memo, strongly 
suggesting a new trend in enforcement of marijuana’s federal 
prohibition.61 The Cole Memo, written by then Deputy Attorney 
General James M. Cole, laid out the Obama-era policy on the federal 
government’s approach to state-legal marijuana operations.62 The 
Cole Memo effectively deprioritized the use of federal funds to 
enforce marijuana prohibition under the CSA, instead recommending 
“a more laissez-faire, hands-off approach.”63 Indeed, the Cole Memo 
noted, “the federal government has traditionally relied on state and 
local law enforcement agencies to address marijuana activity through 
enforcement of their own narcotics laws.”64 
The DOJ released Attorney General Sessions’s memo, which was 
addressed to all United States attorneys.65 The memo reads, “previous 
nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement is unnecessary 
 
line/wp/2018/01/05/why-jeff-sessions-marijuana-crackdown-is-going-to-make-legalization-more-
likely/?utm_term=.c96dab120278 (“He says that was a joke, but even so, it still says something 
about where he’s coming from.”). 
 58. Alicia Wallace, Federal Marijuana Law Enforcement: What You Need to Know, 
CANNABIST (Mar. 7, 2017, 9:20 AM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/03/07/federal-marijuana-
enforcement-trump-administration-experts-questions/74933/. 
 59. Jessica Taylor, Attorney General Orders Crackdown on ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ Threatens 
Holding Funds, NPR (Mar. 27, 2017, 3:42 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/03/27/521680263/attorney-general-orders-crackdown-on-sanctuary-
cities-threatens-holding-funds (“Sanctuary cities” are “generally defined as places where local law 
enforcement limit their cooperation with federal authorities on immigration enforcement.”). 
 60. Margolis, supra note 6. 
 61. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, III to All U.S. Attorneys, (Jan. 
4, 2018) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice); Reid Wilson, Sessions Will End Policy that Allowed 
Legalized Marijuana to Prosper, HILL (Jan. 4, 2018, 8:53 AM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/367384-sessions-will-end-policy-that-allowed-
marijuana-to-prosper-report. 
 62. Lisa Rough, The Cole Memo: What Is It and What Does It Mean?, LEAFLY (Sep. 14, 
2017), https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/what-is-the-cole-memo. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. James Cole to All U.S. Attorneys 
(Aug. 29, 2013) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 65. Wilson, supra note 61. 
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and is rescinded, effective immediately.”66 Attorney General 
Sessions’s action took place just three days after California’s 
marijuana legalization law went into effect, creating even greater 
uncertainty as to the future of the industry, “which [is] projected to 
bring in $1 billion annually in tax revenue within several years.”67 
Attorney General Sessions’s memo received backlash and 
resistance from both marijuana advocates and politicians, including 
conservatives.68 Senator Cory Gardner, a Republican from Colorado, 
tweeted that the memo “has trampled on the will of voters.”69 Senator 
Gardner also spoke before the Senate, expressing his willingness to 
withhold DOJ nominees until Attorney General Sessions resolves this 
policy dispute.70 In addition, Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, 
executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance, opined that Attorney 
General Sessions wants to maintain a policy that has led to tremendous 
injustices and wasted significant federal resources.71 Ms. Sanchez-
Moreno was not shy in voicing her opinion, stating that “[i]f Sessions 
thinks that makes sense in terms of prosecutorial priorities, he is in a 
very bizarre ideological state, or a deeply problematic one.”72 
Accordingly, Attorney General Sessions has signaled a likely federal 
stance through his memo which effectively doubles down on his 
personal opposition to marijuana. 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF TENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Prior to discussing how a threat to withhold federal funds from 
California for legalizing marijuana might implicate Tenth Amendment 
concerns, the Tenth Amendment’s trends in interpretation must first 
be understood. This Part first outlines the development of the Supreme 
Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence throughout various eras. It 
then proceeds to explain and contextualize seminal cases in which the 
 
 66. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, III, supra note 61. 
 67. Sadie Gurman, Sessions Terminates US Policy that Let Legal Pot Flourish, AP NEWS (Jan. 
4, 2018), https://apnews.com/19f6bfec15a74733b40eaf0ff9162bfa. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Jesse Paul, Cory Gardner Says AG Jeff Sessions’ Decision to Rescind Marijuana Policy 
“Has Trampled on the Will” of Colorado Voters, DENV. POST (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/01/04/cory-gardner-jeff-sessions-marijuana-policy/. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Gurman, supra note 67. 
 72. Id. 
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federal government attempted to influence state action through 
threatening to withhold federal funding to states. 
A.  The Development of the Supreme Court’s Tenth 
Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of 
America states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”73 While seemingly 
straightforward, the Supreme Court has, over time, announced various 
conflicting interpretations of the Tenth Amendment’s power to impose 
limitations on federal authority.74 
In 1936, the Supreme Court decided Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,75 
in which it ruled on the constitutionality of the federal Bituminous 
Coal Conservation Act, which regulated prices, minimum wages, 
maximum hours, and fair practices of the coal industry.76 In finding 
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court in Carter reasoned that employing workers, mining coal, and 
setting wages, hours, and working conditions, were found to be purely 
part of the local process of production, separate from any regulation 
under the Commerce Clause.77 Indeed, as Justice Sutherland 
concluded, “[e]verything which moves in interstate commerce has had 
a local origin. Without local production somewhere, interstate 
commerce, as now carried on, would practically disappear.”78 
Despite its Carter decision, the Supreme Court did not invalidate 
a single federal statute for violating state sovereignty for close to forty 
years. Thus, it appeared that the Tenth Amendment was futile as an 
independent check upon federal power under the Commerce Clause. 
 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 74. See Gary Lawson & Robert Schapiro, Common Interpretation: The Tenth Amendment, 
NAT’L CONST. CTR.: INTERACTIVE CONST., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-x (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
 75. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 303–04. 
 78. Id. at 304. 
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1.  The “Darby Era” 
In 1941, the Supreme Court limited the Carter holding with its 
decision in United States v. Darby.79 In Darby, Darby was charged 
with violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) after he failed to 
comply with wage and hour requirements for his employees that were 
engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce.80 Darby 
challenged the FLSA’s constitutionality, claiming its regulations did 
not fall within the Commerce Clause.81 In a unanimous decision 
written by Justice Stone, the Supreme Court upheld the direct ban on 
interstate shipments, finding the FLSA “sufficiently definite to meet 
constitutional demands.”82 
The decision in Darby noted that the Tenth Amendment did not 
interfere with the case, stating:83 
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which 
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of 
its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of 
the relationship between the national and state governments 
as it had been established by the Constitution before the 
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears 
that the new national government might seek to exercise 
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to 
exercise fully their reserved powers.84 
Accordingly, Darby solidified the Supreme Court’s position on 
the freedom of Congress to impose any conditions it deemed necessary 
upon activity which substantially affected interstate commerce.85 
2.  The “National League of Cities Era” 
The Supreme Court breathed new life into the Tenth Amendment 
in 1976, when it decided National League of Cities v. Usery.86 In 
National League of Cities, the appellants, an association of cities, 
challenged the constitutionality of Congress’s 1974 amendments to 
 
 79. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 80. Id. at 110–11. 
 81. Id. at 111. 
 82. Id. at 125–26. 
 83. Id. at 123. 
 84. Id. at 124. 
 85. Id. at 118–19. 
 86. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
(7) 52.3_GHARIBIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:10 PM 
288 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:275 
 
the FLSA.87 Specifically, the National League of Cities argued that 
Congress did not have the power to apply federal minimum-wage and 
overtime rules to state and municipal employees.88 The Supreme Court 
agreed, holding that the FLSA’s amendments violated the Tenth 
Amendment by intruding upon those powers left to the states.89 
In the National League of Cities decision, the five-Justice 
plurality held that while the amended minimum-wage and overtime 
rules for state employees clearly affected commerce, they also violated 
an independent requirement of the Tenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.90 As Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court previously 
found that “[t]he Amendment expressly declares the constitutional 
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs 
the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal 
system.”91 The fifth vote of the plurality in National League of Cities 
came from Justice Blackmun, who wrote in his concurrence that he 
was “not untroubled by certain possible implications of the Court’s 
opinion.”92 
3.  The “Garcia Era” 
In 1985, the Supreme Court again addressed the Tenth 
Amendment as a limit on Congress’s power in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority.93 In Garcia, Justice Blackmun now 
joined the four dissenting justices from National League of Cities to 
unconditionally overrule the Court’s 1976 holding.94 
There, an employee brought suit against his employer, the San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, arguing that it was bound by 
the FLSA because its function as a transit authority was not a 
traditional function of state government.95 The issue in the case was 
whether or not the overtime and minimum-wage provisions of the 
FLSA were applicable to employees of municipally-owned and 
 
 87. Id. at 836–37. 
 88. Id. at 837. 
 89. Id. at 839–40. 
 90. See id. at 842–43 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). 
 91. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7). 
 92. Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856. 
 93. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 530. 
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operated mass-transit systems.96 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Blackmun acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing traditional 
and non-traditional governmental functions, stating, “The 
constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating 
traffic, for example, or between operating a highway authority and 
operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best.”97 
Justice Blackmun went on to discuss another problem with 
National League of Cities, that of judicial subjectivity.98 His opinion 
states, “Any rule of state immunity that looks to the ‘traditional,’ 
‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental functions inevitably 
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which 
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.”99 Yet, the majority 
stressed that its rejection of National League of Cities did not dispose 
of the limitations upon the federal government using its powers to 
hinder the independence of the states.100 Instead, the Court held that 
states were protected by “procedural safeguards” inherent in the 
federal system.101 
The Garcia dissenters understandably disagreed, believing that 
the majority defeated the significance of the Tenth Amendment.102 In 
his dissent, Justice Powell stated that the majority’s decision 
“effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric 
when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”103 It would be 
several years before other cases began to chip away at Garcia’s broad 
holding. 
4.  South Dakota v. Dole 
With its decision in South Dakota v. Dole104 in 1987, the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutional limitations on Congress’s power 
to withhold funding to states in an effort to encourage their compliance 
with federal law.105 In Dole, the state of South Dakota challenged a 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 538–39. 
 98. Id. at 546–47. 
 99. Id. at 546. 
 100. Id. at 551–52. 
 101. Id. at 552. 
 102. See id. at 528–29. 
 103. Id. at 560. 
 104. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 105. See id. 
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federal law that reduced the provision of federal highway funds to 
states that had a minimum drinking age below twenty-one as 
unconstitutional.106 A majority of the Dole Court disagreed with South 
Dakota and upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute, stating, 
“Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to the States to 
enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise 
choose. But the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the 
States not merely in theory but in fact.”107 
In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that the statute 
did not apply unavoidable pressure because states which establish a 
minimum drinking age lower than twenty-one would lose only a 
relatively small percentage of federal highway funding.108 While 
South Dakota argued that “the coercive nature of this program is 
evident from the degree of success it has achieved,” the Dole Court 
made clear that it could not hold a conditional grant of federal money 
unconstitutional “simply by reason of its success in achieving the 
congressional objective.”109 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist indicated 
that the statute enforced by Congress “is directly related to one of the 
main purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate 
travel.”110 
The Supreme Court in Dole recognized that the federal 
government’s spending power is not unlimited, “but is instead subject 
to several general restrictions articulated in our cases.”111 The Court 
ultimately prescribed a four-factor test for evaluating similar federal 
expenditure cuts, which represented limitations on Congress’s 
spending power: 
The first of these limitations is derived from the language of 
the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power 
must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.” In considering 
whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general 
public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the 
judgment of Congress. Second, we have required that if 
Congress desires to condition the States’ receipt of federal 
 
 106. Id. at 205. 
 107. Id. at 211–12. 
 108. Id. at 211. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 208. 
 111. Id. at 207. 
(7) 52.3_GHARIBIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:10 PM 
2019] FEDERAL FUNDING & MARIJUANA-FRIENDLY STATES 291 
 
funds, it “must do so unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the 
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the 
consequences of their participation.” Third, our cases have 
suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions 
on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 
“to the federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs”’ Finally, we have noted that other constitutional 
provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional 
grant of federal funds.112 
Accordingly, while the Supreme Court in Dole reiterated the 
power of Congress to control its spending, it also placed substantive 
limitations on this power which acknowledged the states’ relative 
autonomy. 
5.  The “New York v. United States Era” (Present-Day Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence) 
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided New York v. United States,113 
which concerned the constitutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Amendments Act of 1985 (LRWAA).114 That statute attempted 
to make each individual state arrange for the disposal of radioactive 
waste generated within its borders.115 One provision of the LRWAA, 
the “take title” incentive, required states that did not arrange for the 
disposal of their waste to “take title” to that waste and be liable for 
damages in connection with its disposal.116 The state of New York 
objected and brought suit against the federal government, claiming 
that the LRWAA violated the Tenth Amendment by forcing it to 
regulate in a particular area.117 
In New York v. United States, the majority of the Supreme Court 
agreed with the State’s position, and held that the “take title” provision 
did indeed violate the Tenth Amendment.118 Justice O’Connor 
detailed this violation, stating that the “take title” provision was either 
forcing states to regulate according to one federal instruction, or 
 
 112. Id. at 207–08 (citations omitted). 
 113. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 114. Id. at 149. 
 115. Id. at 151–52. 
 116. Id. at 153–54. 
 117. Id. at 159–60. 
 118. Id. at 176–77. 
(7) 52.3_GHARIBIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:10 PM 
292 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:275 
 
forcing them to submit to another federal instruction.119 Indeed, the 
Court held that “[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive 
regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”120 Thus, the Supreme Court 
in New York v. United States affirmed that “Congress may not simply 
‘commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.’”121 
In 1997, the Supreme Court took its holding in New York v. 
United States a step further and held that, in addition to being limited 
in commandeering legislative processes, Congress also lacked the 
power to compel a state’s executive branch to perform specific 
functions.122 Printz v. United States123 concerned the Brady Act, a 
1993 amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968.124 The Brady Act 
required the Attorney General to establish a national background 
check system aimed at controlling the flow of firearms.125 Until the 
Attorney General computerized this national system, the Brady Act 
required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct 
background checks before issuing permits to buy firearms.126 Montana 
Sheriff Jay Printz challenged this requirement’s constitutionality, 
contending that the federal government did not have the authority to 
mandate background checks on its behalf.127 
A slim majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Sheriff Printz, 
adhering to the Court’s decision in New York v. United States, and 
added that Congress cannot bypass that decision by directly 
conscripting the state’s officers.128 Justice Scalia delivered the 
opinion, writing, “The Federal Government may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal 
 
 119. Id. at 176. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 
(1981)). 
 122. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 963 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hodel, 
452 U.S. at 288). 
    123.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 124. Id. at 902. 
 125. Id. at 902–03. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 904. 
 128. Id. at 935. 
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regulatory program.”129 Justice Scalia went on to assert that it did not 
matter whether policymaking was involved, because such commands 
by the federal government were fundamentally unconstitutional.130 
Thus, the majority’s opinion stood firm in its belief that “[i]t is an 
essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain 
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of 
authority.”131 
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,132 reaffirming the central holdings 
in New York v. United States and Printz that the Tenth Amendment is 
indeed an independent check on federal powers.133 In Sebelius, the 
National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), twenty-six 
states, and other businesses and individuals (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 
brought suit against the Department of Health and Human Services 
and its Secretary, Kathleen Sebelius (collectively “Defendants”).134 
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) enacted by Congress.135 
Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged two provisions of the ACA: (1) the 
individual mandate requiring American citizens to pay a penalty for 
failing to purchase a health insurance policy of at least minimal 
coverage; and (2) the Medicaid expansion provision requiring states 
to greatly expand the number of covered individuals or risk losing their 
existing federal funding.136 
The Supreme Court concluded by a slim majority that “[t]he 
Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a 
financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be 
characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it 
is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”137 
Still, the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts found 
that while Congress had the power to levy and collect taxes, the ACA 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 928. 
 132. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 133. Id. at 578. 
 134. Id. at 520. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 519–20. 
 137. Id. at 574. 
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was unconstitutional with regard to the powers allotted to Congress 
under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.138 
Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Plaintiffs’ claim that the ACA’s 
threat to withhold existing Medicaid funds to states served “no 
purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up for the dramatic 
expansion in health care coverage effected by the Act.”139 Chief 
Justice Roberts went on to clarify that while the Supreme Court in the 
past had upheld the authority of Congress to condition the receipt of 
funds on the states’ compliance with restrictions on the use of those 
funds, this was based on a means by which Congress could ensure that 
the funds were spent to promote the “general welfare.”140 The opinion 
noted,  
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, 
however, cannot be justified on that basis. When . . . such 
conditions take the form of threats to terminate other 
significant independent grants, the conditions are properly 
viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy 
changes.141 
Chief Justice Roberts distinguished the case at hand from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dole.142 While the Dole Court concluded 
that South Dakota was left with a “prerogative” to reject the policy 
proposed by Congress, the states in Sebelius had no such power.143 
Chief Justice Roberts described the threatened loss of over ten percent 
of a state’s overall budget as “economic dragooning that leaves the 
States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid 
expansion.”144 
 
 138. Id. at 559–61 (“Although the [Necessary and Proper] Clause gives Congress authority to 
‘legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,’ it does 
not license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond those 
specifically enumerated.”). 
 139. Id. at 580. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 581. 
 143. Id. at 581–82. 
 144. Id. at 582. 
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B.  Federal Government Efforts to Control State Action and the 
Attempt to Influence States via the Threat of Withholding 
Federal Funding 
The federal government has also attempted to control state action 
in areas other than marijuana legalization, from sports betting to 
sanctuary cities, via federal statutes and threats to withhold funding 
from states. 
1.  State-Sponsored Sports Betting and the Tenth Amendment 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments addressing the 
relevance of the Tenth Amendment in Christie v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n.145 In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).146 With the exception of a 
few states, PASPA effectively banned sports betting across the 
country.147 However, in 2011, New Jersey citizens overwhelmingly 
approved a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports 
gambling.148 After Governor Chris Christie signed a measure allowing 
sports betting in New Jersey into law in 2012, the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA), National Football League (NFL), 
National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB) 
filed suit against New Jersey, arguing that PASPA overruled state 
law.149 
The Supreme Court sought to address “[whether] a federal statute 
that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on 
private conduct impermissibly commandeer the regulatory power of 
states in contravention of New York v. United States.”150 The Supreme 
Court heard oral arguments for the case on December 4, 2017,151 
where several Justices expressed opinions seemingly favoring New 
 
 145. 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (mem.). 
 146. 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000). 
 147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702–04 (2000). 
 148. David Sheldon, How SCOTUS Caught New Jersey’s Hail Mary on PASPA in 2017 to 
Change US Sports Betting, CASINO.ORG (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.casino.org/news/scotus-
heard-new-jersey-on-paspa-in-2017-to-change-sports-betting. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1488–89 (2018) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
 151. Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 824 
(2017) (mem.) (No. 16-476). 
(7) 52.3_GHARIBIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:10 PM 
296 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:275 
 
Jersey’s position.152 Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court’s notable 
swing vote, stated that PASPA “leaves in place a state law that the 
state does not want, so the citizens of the State of New Jersey are 
bound to obey a law that the state doesn’t want but that the federal 
government compels the state to have. That seems 
commandeering.”153 
Justice Breyer also expressed his concern with PASPA, stating 
that the group of provisions addresses “what kind of law a state may 
have, without a clear federal policy that distinguishes between what 
they want states to do and what the federal government is doing.”154 
He asserted, “That’s what this is about, telling states what to do, and 
therefore, it falls within commandeering.”155 
A ruling from the Supreme Court is pending at the time of this 
Article’s publication. 
2.  The Withholding of Federal Funding from Sanctuary Cities 
Even prior to taking office, President Trump threatened to 
withhold federal funding from cities and counties that pursue their 
status as sanctuary cities.156 In a speech on immigration given in 
August 2016, President Trump claimed, “We will end the sanctuary 
cities that have resulted in so many needless deaths. Cities that refuse 
to cooperate with Federal authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars, 
and we will work with Congress to pass legislation to protect those 
jurisdictions that do assist Federal authorities.”157 
On January 25, 2017, just five days after assuming office, 
President Trump signed an executive order to start construction of a 
 
 152. The Legal Blitz, SCOTUS Oral Arguments Suggest that America’s Sports Betting Ban 
Could Soon End, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 11, 2017, 12:59 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/12/scotus-oral-arguments-suggest-that-americas-sports-betting-
ban-could-soon-end/?rf=1; Daniel Wallach, How the Supreme Court Could Hand a Win to New 
Jersey and Sports Betting, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielwallach/2017/12/11/supreme-court-ncaa-christie-nj-
betting/#424587556ca7. 
 153. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 151, at 31. 
 154. Id. at 40.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Reema Khrais, Trump Promises to Block Funding to Sanctuary Cities, MARKETPLACE 
(Nov. 14, 2016, 4:10 PM), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/11/14/elections/trump-promises-
block-funding-sanctuary-cities. 
 157. President Donald J. Trump Taking Action Against Illegal Immigration, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/28/president-donald-j-
trump-taking-action-against-illegal-immigration. 
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wall on the Mexican border and to cut funding to municipal 
governments acting as sanctuary cities for immigrants.158 
Nevertheless, President Trump’s executive order received instant 
backlash from leading human rights groups, activists, and even the 
judiciary.159 Indeed, the Trump administration’s coercive ban received 
strong resistance from federal courts that deemed the administration’s 
threats as unconstitutional bullying.160 
a.  Northern District of California 
In County of Santa Clara v. Trump,161 Santa Clara and San 
Francisco filed motions to enjoin sections of President Trump’s 
executive order, arguing that cutting federal funding to sanctuary cities 
violated the United States Constitution.162 The Honorable William H. 
Orrick of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California agreed with the counties and placed a nationwide hold on 
President Trump’s executive order.163 
Judge Orrick, a President Obama appointee based in San 
Francisco, granted Santa Clara’s and San Francisco’s motions, holding 
that President Trump’s order violated the United States 
Constitution.164 Judge Orrick found that the counties demonstrated 
that “losing all of their federal grant funding would have significant 
effects on their ability to provide services to their residents and that 
they may have no legitimate choice regarding whether to accept the 
government’s conditions in exchange for those funds.”165 Judge 
Orrick noted that President Trump’s executive order likely violated 
the Tenth Amendment because it sought to coerce states and local 
municipalities to enforce a federal regulatory program.166 Citing 
Printz, New York v. United States, and Sebelius, Judge Orrick 
 
 158. David Smith, Trump Signs Order to Begin Mexico Border Wall in Immigration 
Crackdown, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jan/25/donald-trump-sign-mexico-border-executive-order. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Maura Dolan & Joel Rubin, U.S. Judge Blocks Trump Order Threatening Funds for 
‘Sanctuary’ Cities, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-sanctuary-trump-20170419-story.html. 
 161. 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Dolan & Rubin, supra note 160. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 533. 
 166. Id. 
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reiterated the Supreme Court’s repeated holding that the federal 
government cannot compel, command, or coerce states to adopt 
federal regulatory programs and policies.167 Applying these previous 
holdings to the case at hand, Judge Orrick noted that “[t]he Executive 
Order uses coercive means in an attempt to force states and local 
jurisdictions to honor civil detainer requests, which are voluntary 
‘requests’ precisely because the federal government cannot command 
states to comply with them under the Tenth Amendment.”168 Judge 
Orrick continued to hold that while the Trump administration has the 
ability to incentivize states to voluntarily adopt federal programs, “it 
cannot use means that are so coercive as to compel their compliance. 
The Executive Order’s threat to pull all federal grants from 
jurisdictions that refuse to honor detainer requests or to bring 
‘enforcement action’ against them violates the Tenth Amendment’s 
prohibitions against commandeering.”169 
Thus, Judge Orrick’s straightforward application of the previous 
Supreme Court holdings in Printz, New York v. United States, and 
Sebelius clearly illustrated the constitutional issues surrounding the 
federal government’s threats to withhold federal funding to sanctuary 
cities by way of President Trump’s executive order. 
b.  Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
In July of 2017, Attorney General Sessions repeatedly threatened 
to withhold a $1.5 million federal grant from Philadelphia.170 The 
grant in question was the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 
Grant, which Philadelphia has received every year since the grant’s 
inception in 2005.171 
Attorney General Sessions announced new requirements that 
Philadelphia had to satisfy in order to continue receiving the grant, 
including “that all jurisdictions must communicate with federal 
agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; grant U.S. 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 534. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Claire Sasko, Judge: Philly “Is Not a ‘Sanctuary City’”, PHILADELPHIA (Nov. 15, 2017, 
2:31 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/11/15/sessions-sanctuary-city-ruling/. 
 171. Claire Sasko, Here Is the Lawsuit that Philly Just Filed Against Jeff Sessions, PHILA. 
(Aug. 30, 2017, 10:46 AM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/08/30/philly-sues-jeff-
sessions/. 
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to inmates of 
interest in Philly’s prison system; and provide ICE with 48-hours-
notice of the scheduled release of a prisoner of interest.”172 In 
response, Philadelphia filed a lawsuit against Attorney General 
Sessions, claiming that the conditions he added were contrary to law 
and unconstitutional.173 
On November 15, 2017, the Honorable Michael Baylson of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
ruled that “Department of Justice (DOJ) law enforcement grants can’t 
be withheld from Philadelphia because it refuses full cooperation with 
federal authorities on immigration.”174 In issuing a preliminary 
injunction to Philadelphia, Judge Baylson noted that the conditions set 
forth by Attorney General Sessions did not satisfy the “demanding 
threshold imposed by Dole.”175 Specifically, Judge Baylson stated that 
Attorney General Sessions’s conditions violated the relatedness test 
set forth in Dole, holding that “[t]he important question is whether the 
conditions at issue related to the federal interest in the particular 
program they are attached to.”176 
Judge Baylson then held that even accepting a most generous 
reading of the DOJ’s argument, the DOJ’s interest would be in 
pursuing “criminal justice” broadly.177 Accordingly, the Court held 
that “the fact that immigration enforcement depends on and is deeply 
impacted by criminal law enforcement does not mean that the pursuit 
of criminal justice in any way relies on the enforcement of 
immigration law. Realistically, it does not.”178 
Judge Baylson went on to note that Philadelphia clearly 
established that it used the grant money “for purposes much broader 
than the prosecution of criminals, and that adherence to the 
Department of Justice conditions would conflict with its justifiable 
policies towards non-criminal aliens.”179 Accordingly, in applying the 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Rafael Bernal, Judge Rules DOJ Can’t Withhold Money from Philadelphia over 
‘Sanctuary City’ Policies, HILL (Nov. 15, 2017, 12:49 PM), http://thehill.com/latino/360500-
judge-rules-doj-cant-withhold-money-from-philadelphia-over-sanctuary-city-policies. 
 175. City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 644 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 176. Id. at 642. 
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 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 644. 
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Dole test to the case at hand, Judge Baylson underscored the way in 
which Attorney General Sessions’s repeated threats to withhold 
federal funding to Philadelphia violated the Supreme Court precedent 
established in Dole.180 
IV.  THREATS TO WITHHOLD FEDERAL FUNDING FROM LOCAL 
JURISDICTIONS THAT LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IMPLICATE TENTH 
AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
While the Trump administration has not yet announced a specific 
policy regarding marijuana legalization in California and other states, 
legal scholars have suggested that any future policy may likely feature 
a threat to withhold federal funding in an effort to compel these states 
to abandon their legalization efforts.181 In response to being asked 
whether California could challenge federal enforcement of marijuana 
prohibition, Loyola Law School Professor Karl Manheim responded, 
“[T]hat scenario isn’t likely. They can protest, but in response, the 
federal government can threaten to withhold certain funding.”182 
Sam Kamin, Vicente Sederberg Professor of Marijuana Law and 
Policy at the University of Denver’s Sturm College of Law, also 
commented on the uncertainty of how the spending power might be 
tactically used against states that legalize marijuana by the Trump 
administration.183 Referencing the Sebelius holding that Congress 
could use its spending power as an inducement but not a threat, 
Professor Kamin noted, “It’s not clear what the outer borders of [the 
decision] are.”184 Still, Professor Kamin stated, “I don’t see why the 
 
 180. Id. at 649, 654. 
 181. Melina Delkic, How Jeff Sessions Plans to End Marijuana Before the Year Is Over, 
NEWSWEEK MAG. (Nov. 24, 2017, 7:50 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/will-jeff-sessions-medical-marijuana-718676 (“‘He’s old fashioned 
and very conservative,’ said Philip Heymann, a Harvard Law School professor and former Justice 
Department official for the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton administrations. ‘Literally seven 
years ago, maybe eight years ago, marijuana was thought to be a very dangerous drug. Why would 
he focus on this issue? Because he’s seven years out of date.’”); Michael Roberts, Three Ways 
Trump Could Shut down State-Legal Marijuana, WESTWORD (Dec. 1, 2016, 6:38 AM), 
http://www.westword.com/news/three-ways-trump-could-shut-down-state-legal-marijuana-
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 183. Roberts, supra note 181. 
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federal government might not try to say, ‘We’re going to withhold 
some federal funds unless a state adopts or retains prohibition.’”185 
Indeed, Attorney General Sessions’s recent memo rescinding the 
Cole Memo suggested that the DOJ has no intention of maintaining 
the status quo set forth by President Barack Obama’s administration 
to refrain from interfering with state-level marijuana legalization 
efforts.186 To the contrary, Attorney General Sessions made clear his 
plans to “return to the rule of law.”187 To the extent that the federal 
government were to pursue such a course of action, a court might very 
well find a Tenth Amendment violation. 
If the Trump administration follows through on a policy of 
threatening to withhold funding similar to its threats to sanctuary 
cities, this policy would likely fail under the standard set forth in Dole. 
Indeed, any policy would have to involve spending that promotes the 
“general welfare” while remaining noncoercive and constitutional in 
nature.188 If the potential policy on marijuana mirrored Trump’s 
executive order on the issue of sanctuary cities, federal courts across 
the country would take issue with its strong-armed, threatening 
position. 
Moreover, because the Trump administration has not taken an 
official position on withholding funding to states that legalize 
marijuana, the specific grants which may be threatened remain 
unclear. Scholars have indicated that grants to local law enforcement 
agencies that fail to cooperate with federal anti-marijuana law 
enforcement efforts may face cuts, as may grants allocated for federal 
education spending on schools with drug use statistics above the 
national average.189 Similar to the course of action the Trump 
administration has already taken with regard to sanctuary cities, it 
seems more likely that any federal fund withholding would come in 
the form of cutting grants to state and local anti-crime agencies. 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Read: Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s Memo Changing Marijuana Policy, HILL (Jan. 4, 
2018, 1:28 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/367441-read-attorney-general-jeff-
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 187. Id. 
 188. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211 (1987). 
 189. Robert McVay, What Would Federal Marijuana Enforcement Look Like?, HARRIS 
BRICKEN: CANNA L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.cannalawblog.com/what-would-federal-
marijuana-enforcement-look-like/; Wallace, supra note 58. 
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V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS WITHIN THE BOUNDS 
OF THE LAW 
To satisfy the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, 
the Trump administration should institute a policy which: 
 1.  Specifically promotes the general welfare by reducing the sale 
and consumption of marijuana across the nation, thereby 
proportionally reducing marijuana-related offenses and violence; 
 2.  Explicitly withholds anti-crime funding from law enforcement 
agencies engaged in preventing drug related offenses. Moreover, this 
policy should only withhold funding proportional to the total funding 
received by law enforcement agencies in individual counties 
throughout each state. Finally, the percentage of funds withheld 
should remain below five percent of each county’s total funding for 
anti-crime practices specifically geared towards regulating drug-
related crime and violence; and 
 3.  Directly corresponds with the Controlled Substances Act and 
relates to the federal government’s position on the illegality of 
marijuana. 
Accordingly, if the Trump administration proceeds to institute a 
policy aimed at withholding federal funding from those states that 
have and that wish to pursue the legalization of marijuana, the 
administration will have to do so in a manner which complies with 
Dole’s four-step framework. To do otherwise would present 
constitutional concerns by ignoring the substantive limitations placed 
by the Supreme Court on the federal government’s power to interfere 
with states’ rights.190 
VI.  JUSTIFICATIONS: APPLYING THE DOLE TEST WILL ALLOW A 
POTENTIAL FEDERAL POLICY OF WITHHOLDING FUNDING TO PASS 
CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER 
Reiterating the framework developed in Dole, the Trump 
administration would need to present a policy which satisfies the 
following requirements: (1) the policy must be in pursuit of the general 
welfare; (2) if Congress wishes to apply conditions to states receiving 
federal funds, it must do so unambiguously and enable the states to 
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knowingly exercise their choice; (3) conditions on federal funds must 
be related to the federal government’s interest in a particular national 
project or program; and (4) other provisions of the United States 
Constitution may act as independent bars to Congress’s wishes to 
conditionally grant certain federal funds.191 
A.  Pursuing the General Welfare 
The United States Constitution states that Congress may spend 
money in aid of the general welfare.192 In determining whether 
spending falls into the category of general welfare, the Supreme Court 
has held, “[D]iscretion is at large. The discretion, however, is not 
confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the 
choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise 
of judgment. This is now familiar law.”193 The Supreme Court in 
Helvering v. Davis194 went on to note, “Nor is the concept of the 
general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century 
ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation. 
What is critical or urgent changes with the times.”195 
As the Court in Dole noted: 
Congress found that the differing drinking ages in the States 
created particular incentives for young persons to combine 
their desire to drink with their ability to drive, and that this 
interstate problem required a national solution. The means it 
chose to address this dangerous situation were reasonably 
calculated to advance the general welfare.196 
Thus, to pass constitutional muster, the Trump administration would 
need to frame any withholding of federal funds as a means chosen to 
advance the general welfare. 
In reality, the consequences of withholding local law enforcement 
funding could result in a substantial disservice to the general welfare 
of states that pursue marijuana legalization. Withholding law 
enforcement funding could significantly inhibit local law 
enforcement’s ability to enforce not only drug related offenses, but 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 193. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). 
 194. 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).  
 195. Id. at 641. 
 196. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
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other crimes as well. Ironically, reducing law enforcement funding 
would therefore create the risk of negatively impacting the general 
welfare of states, irrespective of the Trump administration’s intentions 
behind administering and enforcing such a policy. 
However, per the proposed policy set forth above, the Trump 
administration could reason that its aim was to reduce the substantial 
presence and impact of marijuana at the state level. This would thus 
promote the general welfare by reducing marijuana-related offenses 
and violence, thereby supporting the overall well-being of the public 
at large. Similar to Congress’s position in Dole that increasing the 
drinking age would reduce the number of young individuals driving 
inebriated, the Trump administration policy could aim to deter 
marijuana-related crimes by reducing the availability of the drug 
throughout the several states.197 With the power of discretion at its 
side, the Trump administration would not likely face significant 
challenges to this first restriction articulated in Dole. 
B.  Unambiguous Conditions and State Freedom to Exercise Choice 
The Supreme Court in Dole held that the government can only 
withhold federal funding via a federal policy that offers “mild 
encouragement” and where the ultimate decision to abide “remains the 
prerogative of the States.”198 The Sebelius Court distinguished its 
holding from its earlier decision in Dole.199 In Sebelius, Chief Justice 
Roberts noted that “[a] State that opts out of the Affordable Care Act’s 
expansion in health care coverage thus stands to lose not merely ‘a 
relatively small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all 
of it.”200 
Chief Justice Roberts went on to assert that “the financial 
‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild 
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”201 Thus, Sebelius reaffirmed 
in part the standard presented in Dole that in order to remain within 
the bounds of the United States Constitution, Congress is not 
permitted to withhold funding simply as a coercive measure to 
 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. at 211–12. 
 199. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–82 (2012). 
 200. Id. at 581. 
 201. Id. 
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intimidate the States to comply with the federal government’s 
wishes.202 
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,203 the 
Supreme Court likened the federal government’s spending power to a 
contract, stating that “in return for federal funds, the States agree to 
comply with federally imposed conditions.”204 The Court expanded on 
this idea, noting that “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate 
under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily 
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”205 Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned that a state could not knowingly accept such a 
“contract” if the state is unaware of the conditions being imposed on 
it and is unable to ascertain federal expectations.206 Accordingly, the 
Court concluded, “[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the 
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting 
that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise 
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their 
participation.”207 
Just as the conditions in Dole, which “could not be more clearly 
stated by Congress,” the proposed policy would need to 
unambiguously set forth the specific terms by which federal funding 
would be withheld from states.208 Moreover, the proposed percentage 
of funds to be withheld represents a specific subsection of anti-crime 
grants targeting the prevention of marijuana-based offenses and 
violence. As the Sebelius Court pointed out in its analysis of Dole, the 
five percent of highway funds that would be withheld from South 
Dakota “constituted less than half of 1 percent of South Dakota’s 
budget at the time.”209 Here, because the proposed policy’s five 
percent cap only pertains to the narrower subsection of marijuana 
prevention, the actual percentage of total state anti-crime funding 
would be similarly unsubstantial. 
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The Trump administration could therefore successfully employ 
the proposed policy because it is far less coercive than the policy 
which the federal government attempted to institute with regard to 
sanctuary cities. Rather than attempting to withhold large amounts of 
grant funding from states, the proposed policy reflects a noncoercive 
nudge against California and other states attempting to pursue 
marijuana legalization. Accordingly, the proposed policy would likely 
satisfy the second step of the Dole standard requiring unambiguous 
conditions and state freedom to exercise choice. 
C.  The Trump Administration’s Interest in Marijuana Legalization 
The third restriction set forth by the Supreme Court in Dole 
requires conditions on federal funds to be related “to the federal 
interest in particular national projects or programs.”210 
Indeed, almost thirty years prior to Dole, the Supreme Court ruled 
that “the Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable 
conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all 
objectives thereof.”211 
In Dole, South Dakota did not seriously challenge the notion that 
the federal government’s withholding of funds was unrelated to a 
national interest.212 To the contrary, the condition imposed by 
Congress was “directly related to one of the main purposes for which 
highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel.”213 
The memo released by the DOJ on January 4, 2018, begins to 
present Attorney General Sessions’s position on the federal 
government’s national interest in state-level marijuana legalization. 
The memo reads: 
In the Controlled Substances Act, Congress has generally 
prohibited the cultivation, distribution, and possession of 
marijuana. It has established significant penalties for these 
crimes. These activities also may serve as the basis for the 
prosecution of other crimes, such as those prohibited by the 
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money laundering statutes, the unlicensed money transmitter 
statute, and the Bank Secrecy Act. These statutes reflect 
Congress’s determination that marijuana is a dangerous drug 
and that marijuana activity is a serious crime.214 
The proposed policy calls for a narrower approach to withholding 
funds—only targeting marijuana-related anti-crime funding—than 
that which the Trump administration attempted with sanctuary cities. 
In addition, Attorney General Sessions’s policy is directly related to 
the federal government’s position that marijuana should not be 
legalized pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.215 The Trump 
administration has repeatedly expressed the federal interest in keeping 
the cultivation, sale, and possession of marijuana illegal.216 In addition 
to significant penalties for the crimes associated with growing and 
selling marijuana, Attorney General Sessions has further claimed that 
its dangers create additional crimes in the areas of money laundering 
and fraud.217 Thus, the proposed policy merely reflects the Controlled 
Substances Act and the federal government’s interest in preventing the 
various crimes that arise with the increased presence of marijuana 
across the country. Accordingly, such a policy would presumably 
satisfy the national interest requirement set forth in Dole. 
D.  Other Potential Constitutional Bars 
The final restriction presented in Dole asserts that “other 
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the 
conditional grant of federal funds.”218 In interpreting the independent 
constitutional bar, the Dole Court held that this limitation was not “a 
prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress 
is not empowered to achieve directly.”219 Instead, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist held that the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions stood for 
“the unexceptional proposition that the power may not be used to 
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induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.”220 
The Dole Court then provided examples of what may constitute 
such inducement, stating that “a grant of federal funds conditioned on 
invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress’ 
broad spending power.”221 Accordingly, the Court concluded that even 
if South Dakota were to “succumb to the blandishments offered by 
Congress and raise its drinking age to 21, the State’s action in so doing 
would not violate the constitutional rights of anyone.”222 
Thus, should the proposed Trump administration policy of 
withholding federal funds from states that legalize marijuana satisfy 
the first three restrictions announced in Dole, the Tenth Amendment 
will not interfere as an independent constitutional bar. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
If the Trump administration pursues a policy threatening to 
withhold funding from California and the other states that seek to 
legalize marijuana, it must present a federal policy consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s framework set forth in Dole. If the federal 
government instead attempts to impose such a threat with the intent to 
simply coerce and punish noncompliant states, such a threat would 
constitute a violation of the powers otherwise reserved to the States 
under the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
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